Software

Of Flash Player versions and codesigning and signatures

It’s certainly an understatement to say that there’s been a lot of talk about the Adobe Flash Player on Apple platforms in the last year. On Mac OS X, Apple bundles the Flash Player and tends to distribute some — but not all — updates to it.

I wanted compare the bundled Flash Player version against the latest version from Adobe, which is currently v10.1.82.76. So, let’s look at what comes with Snow Leopard from the perspective of a codesigned executable.

# Flash Player version 10.0.45.2
# Installed with Mac OS X Snow Leopard v10.6.4
$ codesign -vvv /Library/Internet\ Plug-Ins/Flash\ Player.plugin
/Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin: valid on disk
/Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin: satisfies its Designated Requirement

A quick look at the bundled plugin shows that it is codesigned. This means that it has a known signature. If the executable is modified, the signature will no longer be valid. The signature is tied to the identity of a signing authority, which is generally the source of the software.

It may be helpful to think of codesigning as a tamper-resistant seal from the manufacturer. It’s not going to protect you from lots of different kinds of vulnerabilities, but if its cryptographic signature is intact and valid, you have a good idea that the software hasn’t been modified by a third party.

Mac OS X Leopard and Snow Leopard have shipped with applications signed by Apple. The Flash Player plugin comes from Adobe. So, who signs the bundled Flash Player?

$ codesign -dvvv /Library/Internet\ Plug-Ins/Flash\ Player.plugin
Executable=/Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin/Contents/MacOS/Flash Player
Identifier=com.macromedia.Flash Player.plugin
Format=bundle with Mach-O universal (i386 ppc)
CodeDirectory v=20100 size=34023 flags=0x0(none) hashes=1694+3 location=embedded
CDHash=f81bb75e4ec6f085f59e3c21021136c0f974fa7a
Signature size=4064
Authority=Software Signing
Authority=Apple Code Signing Certification Authority
Authority=Apple Root CA
Info.plist entries=12
Sealed Resources rules=9 files=2
Internal requirements count=1 size=188

You’d be forgiven for not having your eye drawn to the answer immediately, but it’s right there on the “Authority” lines. Just as with the rest of Mac OS X, Apple signed the Flash Player plugin they bundled with the OS.

Now, let’s upgrade the plugin to the latest version available from Adobe and see what happens to the signature. Courtesy of Preston’s WatchedInstall tool, we can see that the plugin’s CodeResources file is removed during this upgrade. Interestingly, the “Adobe Flash Player Install Manager” application installed with the update is codesigned.

- /Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin/Contents/CodeResources
- /Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin/Contents/_CodeSignature/CodeResources
+ /Applications/Utilities/Adobe Flash Player Install Manager.app/Contents/CodeResources
+ /Applications/Utilities/Adobe Flash Player Install Manager.app/Contents/_CodeSignature/CodeResources

The newer Flash Player version, however, seems to consist of two new plugins contained within the overall structure of a parent plugin. Neither the parent nor the new applications within the same bundle install a new code signature. This results in three unsigned executables:

# Flash Player version 10.1.82.76
# Installed on Mac OS X 10.6.4
$ codesign -vvv /Library/Internet\ Plug-Ins/Flash\ Player.plugin
/Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin: code object is not signed
$ codesign -vvv /Library/Internet\ Plug-Ins/Flash\ Player.plugin/Contents/PlugIns/FlashPlayer-10.6.plugin
/Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin/Contents/PlugIns/FlashPlayer-10.6.plugin: code object is not signed
$ codesign -vvv /Library/Internet\ Plug-Ins/Flash\ Player.plugin/Contents/PlugIns/FlashPlayer-10.4-10.5.plugin
/Library/Internet Plug-Ins/Flash Player.plugin/Contents/PlugIns/FlashPlayer-10.4-10.5.plugin: code object is not signed

Therefore, you trade the known security vulnerabilities of the older version of Flash Player bundled with the operating system with a different kind of security problem with the new version. It would be silly to not make that trade if you are browsing the Web at all on a Snow Leopard-based computer.

However, it’s also difficult to understand why a large corporation with the resources of Adobe cannot codesign a piece of software as critical to the Mac OS X browsing experience as the Adobe Flash plugin is — especially when its “Install Manager” application is signed.

It’s also puzzling why Apple continues to trail well behind the latest releases of Flash Player. Add to that mystery the question of why Apple never updates the absolutely antique bundled version of the Shockwave Player plugin.

Run Drupal cron with Drush at Site5

After starting to use Drush, I wanted to switch my Drupal cron jobs over to it. I’d previously been running these jobs the standard way, loading a URL for each of my Drupal sites with curl. That curl command was run by the cron; Site5 allows editing of your crontab directly or through its Backstage Web interface.

I started with the basics. Drush was installed in my home directory, with an alias under ~/bin in my Site5 account. I replaced my curl command one-for-one with the following:

$ /home/your_site5_account/bin/drush \
--quiet \
--root=/home/your_site5_account/public_html/your_drupal_site/ \
cron

This didn’t work out well. I was getting a huge number of mail messages, indicating problems with the cron jobs. The messages typically contained “tput: No value for $TERM and no -T specified.” Needless to say, this was rather frustrating, so after some trial and error, I modified the command as follows, and that has been working better for me.

$ /usr/local/bin/php \
-d memory_limit=64M \
/home/your_site5_account/drush/drush.php \
--quiet \
--root=/home/your_site5_account/public_html/your_drupal_site/ \
cron

The biggest change is that I specify PHP, rather than Drush, directly. This was done so that I could increase the PHP memory limit for the cron job significantly, to 64M, while running Drush. I’m sure that this increase was needed partly due to the number of modules I have installed on my main site (which has an even larger default PHP memory limit in its php.ini). My research indicated that I needed to do this for Drush since it doesn’t access the Drupal sites in the same way loading a page does.

The other noticeable change is that I provide the path to the drush.php file rather than pointing to the Drush alias.

McAfee DAT update 5958 as trending topic on Twitter

The McAfee DAT update 5958 was issued on April 21, 2010, and created quite a situation. Heretofore, I will remember what transpired as “the events of April 21.”

I think that someday, examining what happened would make an interesting case study in crisis management. A lot of the incident unfolded on the Internet — and on Twitter, specifically. The company even became a trending topic, as seen in this screenshot I took after lunchtime (I think around 2 PM Eastern time, although I only saved later):

McAfee5958TwitterTrendingTopicHilite.png

The 5958 DAT was available on McAfee’s publicly-accessible HTTP and FTP download repositories until at least 1 PM Eastern, when I was checking on them.

McAfeeFTP5958.png

The Windows and Mac anti-malware products from McAfee share DAT updates, which provide virus definitions. I was able to update VirusScan for Mac OS X to 5958 with no ill effects in the midst of the developing situation. (The problem only appears to have affected Windows XP systems.) Later, when McAfee had posted a newer update as version 5959, I was also able to download that.

McAfeeVirusScan5959.png

Based on reports I saw on Twitter and the Web, McAfee was overwhelmed by this — particularly its call center and its Web-based customer forums. This allowed a lot of speculation and misinformation — along with humor — to break out.

I’ve saved this undoctored screen shot for a while. I figure I’ll end with it, even though it’s unrelated to the events of April 21.

McAfeeSecurityNoHelpAvailable.png

Get the display resolution on Mac OS X with PyObjC

I came across this hint about display properties on StackOverflow and thought it was worthwhile to write down for later. If you want to get the screen or Desktop resolution of a Mac via Python, you can do so with PyObjC.

First, let’s get the information about the main screen:

>>> from AppKit import NSScreen
>>> print(NSScreen.mainScreen().frame())
<NSRect origin=<NSPoint x=0.0 y=0.0> size=<NSSize width=1920.0 height=1200.0>>

If you want just the horizontal and vertical resolution from that blob of data, you can pull the width and height out:

>>> print(NSScreen.mainScreen().frame().size.width)
1920.0
>>> print(NSScreen.mainScreen().frame().size.height)
1200.0
>>> width, height = NSScreen.mainScreen().frame().size.width, NSScreen.mainScreen().frame().size.height
>>> width, height
(1920.0, 1200.0)

This might be useful in situations where you don’t have any of the “hundred of portable libs in Python that give you access to that information” — such as in your stock Mac OS X Python installation. To clarify: I’m in no way meaning to belittle that there are portable libraries that would let you do the same thing, but you also have to program for your audience and its constraints. One of the reasons I appreciate Python over some scripting languages is that you get so much capability in the Standard Library. However, on Mac OS X, you don’t get modules like pygame by default (yet … and maybe never) while you do get PyObjC.

Generate version numbers for Mac OS X package installers with Mercurial and Semantic Versioning

I’ve had occasion to create some installer packages lately, and the topic of assigning a version number to them has rattled around in my head. The version number of an installer package is shown in the Finder’s Get Info windows, and in the preview pane of column view, so it has some usefulness just for telling one installer apart from another. And, importantly, the version number provides a way for Installer to determine whether a package has previously been installed and simply needs to be upgraded.

At first, I was just going to assign the date in YYYYMMDD format as the version, just to “keep things simple” by using:

$ date +%Y%m%d
20100324

Then I was rebuilding the packages several times a day, and wanted to distinguish between the builds, so I switched to YYYYMMDD.hhmm.

$ date +%Y%m%d.%H%M
20100324.2240

This seemed ridiculous after a day. Although I could distinguish between builds, the installers I was building weren’t really changing per se. They were the same payload and scripts and resources, just rebuilt by the command line packagemaker tool using The Luggage.

I crowdsourced my question about versioning, and Steve Losh helpfully responded with the idea to use Mercurial tags along with Semantic Versioning.

My package sources are already checked into Mercurial repositories, so this made a good deal of sense. It meant that I’d have to use tags to identify a version number — it would no longer be as automatic as using the current date. However, certain parts of the version string would be automatic, and the only manual part would be tagging revisions in Hg.

I had already bookmarked Semantic Versioning a while back, but had forgotten about it and never done much of anything with it. If I followed the Semantic Versioning standard, I’d create a “semver” tag to set up the repository, and then a new “vX.Y.Z” tag for actual releases thereafter. Steve further suggested the use of the “latest tag distance” and “short node hash” for the Hg revision, and that information is automatically available from Hg.

Semantic Versioning states, “when tagging releases in a version control system, the tag for a version MUST be ’vX.Y.Z’ e.g. ’v3.1.0’.” I felt I would have to strip the “v” from the version tag to use it cleanly as a package version. This results in commands like the following, where I’ve used sed to remove that character:

# Full Semantic Version with further identifying information from Mercurial
$ hg log -r. --template '{latesttag}+{latesttagdistance}-{node|short}\n'
v1.0.0+1-df34ebfc12c9
# Strip the "v" with sed
$ hg log -r. --template '{latesttag}+{latesttagdistance}-{node|short}\n' | sed -e 's/^v//'
1.0.0+1-df34ebfc12c9
# Basic Semantic Version
$ hg log -r. --template '{latesttag}\n'
v1.0.0
# Strip the "v" with sed
$ hg log -r. --template '{latesttag}\n' | sed -e 's/^v//'
1.0.0

This is something I can build into makefiles for use with The Luggage, so I’m going to try it out. On first glance, I think it even fits in nicely with the concept of The Luggage. It automates much of the version-assignment process. And, it takes advantage of version control for both repeatable results and peer review.

Remove filename extensions with os.path.splitext instead of the {lr}strip or replace methods in Python

Jesper Noehr explains why {l,r}strip are considered harmful for removing extensions from filenames with Python. I think he’s absolutely right on that score, and I would agree. The lstrip() and rstrip() methods shouldn’t be used for this purpose.

However, like the only commenter on that post, I’d also recommend os.path.splitext() as the proper tool for the extension-removing job.

Let’s take some example filenames you might come across on Mac OS X Snow Leopard:

>>> a = [ 'Document.pages', 'Property List.plist', 'Application.app', 'Word.docx', 'VPN (Cisco VPN).networkConnect', 'Dated Spreadsheet 2010.02.17.xlsx']

If we had a list of filenames (or file paths) like this — perhaps created by os.walk() or some other generator-based process — we couldn’t easily use Jesper’s recommended solution. The replace() string method would give us a much harder time dealing with the range of filenames and extensions in that list. In the case where you don’t know the filename extensions in advance, replace() breaks down. The replace() method would have to be looped with many possible filename extensions.

What we need is a way to split filename from extension, even if we don’t know the extension beforehand. The os.path.splitext() alternative does just that, returning a tuple. Here, I’ll import the os module and then use a list comprehension to run os.path.splitext() through every filename in the list above.

>>> import os
>>> [os.path.splitext(x) for x in a]
[('Document', '.pages'), ('Property List', '.plist'), ('Application', '.app'), ('Word', '.docx'), ('VPN (Cisco VPN)', '.networkConnect'), ('Dated Spreadsheet 2010.02.17', '.xlsx')]

It becomes a simple matter to get just the filename from the tuple, as I do here by modifying the list comprehension to just get the zeroth item from it:

>>> [os.path.splitext(x)[0] for x in a]
['Document', 'Property List', 'Application', 'Word', 'VPN (Cisco VPN)', 'Dated Spreadsheet 2010.02.17']

Note that several interesting conditions are handled by os.path.splitext():

  • long filename extensions, including “.pages” and “.networkConnect”
  • spaces in filenames, as in “Property List.plist”
  • parentheses, as in “VPN (Cisco VPN).networkConnect”
  • periods within the filename, as seen in “Dated Spreadsheet 2010.02.17.xlsx”

Access to this item is restricted

I had an odd situation over the weekend that resulted in the inability to view the passwords associated with keys in my Mac OS X user keychain. Every time I clicked on the “Show password” checkbox in a key’s detail window, I’d get an “Access to this item is restricted” dialog.

Needless to say, this was disconcerting. I happened to have a lot of data in that keychain — this is what I get for keeping the same one around since Mac OS X 10.0 or 10.1. While I could revert to a backup, the newest backup wasn’t as recent as I would like. Plus, I just wanted to know why the problem had cropped up.

So, I asked about my problem on the Apple-CDSA mailing list. If anyone would be able to help with the obscure corners of keychains, I figured the people there would.

Very promptly, I got a reply from Ken McLeod, which led me to check the validity of the code signature on the Keychain Access utility.

$ codesign -vvv /Applications/Utilities/Keychain\ Access.app
/Applications/Utilities/Keychain Access.app: code or signature modified

Clearly, the signature and the application didn’t match. Something was amiss.

I reinstalled Mac OS X 10.6.2 on the system, using the latest combo update installer package, and cleared up the problem signature mismatch.

$ codesign -vvv /Applications/Utilities/Keychain\ Access.app
/Applications/Utilities/Keychain Access.app: valid on disk
/Applications/Utilities/Keychain Access.app: satisfies its Designated Requirement

In retrospect, although I wouldn’t have thought of this being a problem, this breakage between the signature and the app — and its affect on my ability to view stored passwords — gives me confidence that thought has been put into the code signing mechanism in Mac OS X. You wouldn’t want a compromised app displaying your unencrypted keychain items, after all.

Weird things happen when you run out of disk space

I had interesting things happen when I ran out of disk space today.

The most notable one was that I saw “Process completed” — or some variant of that — every time I tried to open a Terminal window with a new shell session. I briefly staved it off by specifying Bash as my shell, but then it came right back after opening another tab or two in Terminal. Consulting Google led me to this “Terminal application quits” thread at Apple Discussions. On a lark, I tried deleting /usr/bin/login as one poster suggested. It worked!

…But only for a little while. The problem returned. In the meantime, I had freed up some disk space because I’d realized I couldn’t save files anywhere (“But ~/Pictures is writable!”). Clearly something else had become an issue, because disk space was available.

Then I found another thread, “Terminal’s ’Process Completed’ message and /usr/bin/login,” on Apple Discussions. The more permanent solution from that thread appears to be the removal of corrupted Apple System Log databases. Once I did that and restarted the ASL service, all was well and has stayed that way so far.

Filling up my disk must have corrupted the logs as they were being written or rotated, and led to this cascade failure. Like I said, interesting!

One of the posters in the second Apple Discussions thread indicated that the underlying database corruption issue is addressed in Snow Leopard. However, it seems that you could still see this on Leopard — my experience was with a recently-patched Mac OS X 10.5.8 system.

The new Apple Education Licensing Program

The new Apple Education Licensing Program replaces the Apple Maintenance Program (AMP) as the primary way to purchase ongoing software upgrade rights for a school, college, or university’s fleet of Macintosh computers. The Apple Education Licensing Program (AELP? or just ELP?) is a yearly, renewable license.

I think this is a big deal because it’s awfully close to what I’ve asked Apple for year after year — especially at venues like WWDC (at least when they have presented the opportunity for giving constructive feedback).

The ELP licensing for Mac OS X is actually a bundle — called the “Mac Software Collection” — of the operating system combined with the iLife and iWork suites. (It aligns with the same bundle of software in the standalone “Mac Box Set.”) I believe that the bundling of iLife is the biggest win, because it provides upgrade rights to software that is bundled with every new Mac but frequently updated. If you are managing a larger group of Macs over several years, the licensing and deployment issues involved with iLife could be complex — moreso because it’s the kind of software that people want on their computers. It also doesn’t hurt that Keynote is included — anecdotally, it appears to sell a lot of Macs in organizations all by itself.

The ability to keep the operating system and core applications from the Mac Software Collection up-to-date across a range of Macs with a single renewable license could be a tremendous savings in administrative overhead.

Organizations must cover 100 percent of their installed base of owned or leased Macs, at least for the Mac Software Collection. This may be a deal-breaker for a number of universities and perhaps other organizations that tend to be decentralized in their operations.

Apple’s other software can also be obtained through ELP, but can be purchased to cover 100 percent of computers at the departmental level. It is possible that the exact nature of the organizational unit is at the organization’s discretion.

ELP allows the flexibility to cover faculty/staff home use as well as students, should the organization elect to pay for that additional coverage.

Each ELP purchase appears to incur a one-time 10 percent enrollment fee. If an organization doesn’t renew for a year but then buys again later, it may be subject to the enrollment fee again. And, if you have a lot of departments seeking Apple’s Pro Apps or IT-related software, those 10 percent charges could add up to significant overhead. I’m not sure if there’s a clear way to allow two or three departments to get the software they want without requiring an entire educational institution’s Macs be covered.

As part of the introduction of ELP, educational institutions are being encouraged to move to the new licensing program before December 13, 2009, through a waiver of the enrollment fee. It appears possible to crossgrade from AMP to ELP, at least if you talk to your Apple account team.

I am not aware whether Apple has rolled out something similar to organizations outside education.

AppleScript date and time format parsing change in Snow Leopard

I had a handy script I wrote on a plane years ago that let me block off my Entourage calendar at specific times each weekday for a given week. The times for these events were created by concatenating some strings and converting the result into an AppleScript date object. I mention that merely for background, and because it was an incredibly geeky way to automate the tedious process of blocking off lunch on my calendar (without resorting to recurring events).

I found that my script didn’t work in Snow Leopard — despite flawless operation across several successive major versions of Mac OS X. The dates themselves remained correct, but the times were all coming up as 12:00 a.m. instead of what was expected.

For example, here’s a simplified reproduction scenario you can try on Snow Leopard:

set vEventDateString to "Friday, August 28, 2009"
set vEventStartTime to "10:00 a.m."
log vEventStartTime
(*10:00 a.m.*)
set vEventStartDate to the (date (vEventDateString & " " & vEventStartTime))
log vEventStartDate
(*date Friday, August 28, 2009 12:00 AM*)

It turns out that the fix is easy if not exactly obvious: remove the periods from “a.m.” and “p.m.” before converting strings to date objects. (I use the periods because I follow the Associated Press Stylebook!)

set vEventDateString to "Friday, August 28, 2009"
set vEventStartTime to "10:00 am"
log vEventStartTime
(*10:00 am*)
set vEventStartDate to the (date (vEventDateString & " " & vEventStartTime))
log vEventStartDate
(*date Friday, August 28, 2009 10:00 AM*)

So, there is a workaround in the unlikely event you encounter the same problem with your scripts.

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